Zakładam, że dzieje się to podobnie jak w przypadku dzielenia się plikami z Proton Drive - Ty jako właściciel zasobu, który ma do niego pełen dostęp, może nadać Lumo uprawnienia do udziału. Model szyfrowania i współdzielenia zasobów w Proton Drive jest dość dobrze (aczkolwiek mocno technicznie) opisany tutaj: proton.me/blog/protondrive-security
Proton says your chats are stored with the same zero-access encryption as your email. That’s great! But their wording is: “end-to-end encryption in your chat history.”
What are the ends in this scenario? And why not just say “end-to-end encryption in your chat”? Well, obviously, because they can’t say that.
If you’re using a remote chatbot like Lumo, the chat has to exist as plain text for the chatbot to see it, for some unspecified length of time. Same if you dump files into the chatbot from your end-to-end-encryptoed Proton Drive — their version of Google Drive.
That’s how most web services work, and it might not sound like a big deal — but Proton’s email famously does not work like that. There is never plain text at rest. So Proton is trying to handwave on their past reputation and say, well, parts of it are totally secure. Just not the rest.
Proton also used to publish complete cryptographic threat models for its products. They didn’t for the AI email assistant and they haven’t for Lumo. It’s a glaring absence.
Dzięks! – podaję dalej i proponuję swoim organizacjom.
Warto odnotować:
Because of legal uncertainty around Swiss government proposals to introduce mass surveillance — proposals that have been outlawed in the EU — Proton is moving most of its physical infrastructure out of Switzerland. Lumo will be the first product to move.
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